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A DEFINITION OF LAW
A DEFINITION OF LAW.1
W HAT is law, in its legal sense?
Blackstone said that law, in its most general and compre-
hensive sense, "is that rule of action which is prescribed by some
superior and which the inferior is bound to obey. ' 2  Civil law
he defined as "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme
power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what
is wrong."' 3  In Blackstone's definitions there are two main con-
cepts: (1) the concept of a "superior," and (2) the concept of
a command."'4  Is Blackstone's definition correct in either of
these respects ?
Is law something set, or given, by a superior to an inferior, or
by a sovereign to a person in a state of subjection? This con-
cept of Blackstone would exclude all international law, as per-
haps it should, but it has been criticised on this account. 5 It
would also exclude constitutional law and all law adopted by a
people of a country, as in the United States. Such constitutions,
and for that matter all law in such jurisdictions, is adopted by
the sovereign people for their own control, not by some superiors
for other inferiors. Since Blackstone's definition does not in-
clude this sort of law, the proper conclusion is, not that there is
no such law, but that the definition is inadequate.
Is law a command? Even Austin had difficulty in fitting his
definition to "laws explaining the import of existing positive
laws, and the laws abrogating or repealing existing positive law."
How could it any better be applied to any of the common law?
' The substance of this article will later appear as part of a chapter in a
book on Introduction to Anglo-American Law, which the author has in proc-
ess of preparation.
1 BLACKSTONE, COMmzNTARIES, 38.
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 44.
These two concepts, though worded differently, are the basis of Austin's
definition: "Positive law is set by a monarch or sovereign member, to a per-
son or persons in a state of subjection to its author." 1 AUSTIN, PROVWNc
OF JURISPRUDENce, 2.
" CLARK, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE, 134, 172, 186, 187; HALL, INTIERNA-
TIONAL LAw, 17; POLLOCK, OXFORD LCTURES, 19.
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In the United States, as concerns all civil as distinguished from
criminal law, law is not a command. The la-% does not com-
mand people not to commit trespasses and other torts; nor
promisors to perform their promises, except perhaps in the few
rare cases where the remedies of injunction and specific perform-
ance are available. The state has policemen, judges, and other
officers of the law, but they are not ordinarily commanding any-
one to do anything with respect to what is known as civil law.
They may give people advice. In the course of time they may
bring people into court for some civil wrong that they may have
done. But they do not issue commands to people telling them
how they must treat each other. As concerns criminal law,
Blackstone's concept seems nearer the truth. It might easily be
possible to think of the state as commanding the people not to
commit certain criminal acts. Yet the true concept of criminal
law is not that of something commanded not to be done. In this
respect it is like civil law, as will be pointed out later on. 6 Hence
Blackstone's definition is inadequate in both respects. Leon
Duguit was right when he said, "Law is not the command of a
sovereign state, but a by-law governing a group."' 7
What, then, is a correct definition of law?
From what has been said above, it should be noted that law
is a scheme of social control. It is not the simple thing that a
"command from a superior to an inferior" would be. It is a
complicated contrivance; a connected combination of things. It
is a scheme. In the first place the scheme is a form of social con-
trol. It is not a scheme of individual control. The individual
is free to control his own conduct, so long as it does not affect
others. He may choose his own vocation, choose his own domi-
cile, and regulate his own conduct in a thousand and one other
ways, without any interference by the law, provided he alone is
concerned. But if his conduct affects the lives of his fellowmen,
then there is a possibility of control by the law.
In the second place it should be noted that, while law is a
scheme of social control, it does not attempt to control all social
relations. It controls them only so far as social interests require
' See Criticism in DILLON, LAWS AND JURISPRUDS1CS OP ENGLAND AND
AmERICA, 10.
' 32 Yale L. J. 425.
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such control. As human beings come in closer contact with each
other they have more wants, or social interests. Kant has truly
said that if a man was alone in the world, or on a desert island,
he would call nothing "his own" (proprius). What is true of
external things is true of personality. A solitary human being
would have no wants against other human beings. Hence there
would be no social interests. But the more people are thrown
into contact with each other, the more social interests they have.
People in rural districts do not have as many social interests as
people in urban communities. People in small urban communi-
ties do not have as many social interests as people in large cities.
As social life becomes more complex, more social interests have
to be recognized. In the early history of the world there were
not as many social interests as there are today. In the early his-
tory of our country there were not as many social interests as
there are now. At first the only social interest recognized was
that of the preservation of the peace. Later there was a social
interest in the maintenance of the status quo. This was a para-
mount social interest in Greek, Roman, and English history be-
fore the nineteenth century. In modern times numerous social
interests have grown up. What social interests shall be recog-
nized is determined (theoretically) by the sovereign power,-in
the United States by the majority of the people in the state, as
they express themselves through their representatives in the halls
of legislation and their judges on the benches. The determina-
tion of a new social interest is often a difficult matter. Society
is made up of many conflicting and overlapping groups, as
capitalists, laborers, farmers, consumers, producers and the like.
Representatives may be governed by self-interest and judges in-
fluenced by bias and prejudice. Under such circumstances it is
often difficult to decide what is the social interest. What, for
example, is the social interest in such matters as the tariff, child
labor, liquor, and drugs? Yet, in the complex modern world, if
many social interests were not recognized and protected, life
would be intolerable. The human race, through warfare, de-
generacy, ignorance and laziness would soon destroy itself.
Law, then, is a scheme of social control, for the protection of
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those social interests which society in some way decides shall be
protected.8
However, in order to understand the nature of law, it is neces-
sary, not only to know what its purpose is, but also how it ac-
complishes its purpose.. As a matter of fact the greater part of
the scheme of social control known as law consists of the means
whereby it accomplishes its purpose. We have already noted
that the law does not protect social interests by sending someone
out, like a policeman, to see that all people respect them. The
scheme is much more complicated. What is the nature of this
scheme? In order to find the answer to this question let us ex-
amine the phenomena of the law; let us keep our feet on the
ground; let us get the exact data; so that, after we have got the
data we may make our definition conform to the facts, instead
of first framing a definition and then trying to make the facts
conform to our definition.
In pursuance of this policy, let us examine the law of con-
tracts, which is one of the phenomena of the law. What do we
have in a contract? A first thing which we observe is that we
have a promise, or two promises each given for the other. But
there is not anything magical in a promise. People are making
promises all of the time. Most of them are not contracts, and
do not have any legal consequences. A contract is a promise
which has legal consequences. What are they? Clearly the law
' Pound gives the following as a classified list of all the social interests
which have received protection up to date:
I. General Security.
A. Personality.
1. Physical Person.
a. Direct Injury.
b. Bodily Health.
c. Freedom of Will-Physical Existence.
d. Mental Health.
c. Nervous System.
f. Privacy.
2. Honor and Reputation-Social Existence.
3. Belief and Opinion-Spiritual Existence.
B. Domestic Relations.
1. Parental.
2. Marital.
C. Substance-Economic Existence.
1. Property.
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"commands" no one to make a contract. But after he has made
a contract the law has something to say about it. What is it?
In the first place it. says that one person-the promisee-and
both persons-if each is a promisee,-has a legal right to the
performance of the promise, and the other party is under a cor-
relative legal obligation to perform the promise. Why? Because
the. promise in the form of a contract is one of such importance
that its non-performance is liable to have bad social consequences
in that it would tend to destroy the general security which is
necessary for a stable and permanent social order, or perhaps
even to disturb the peace of society. In other words, because
there is a social interest in general security which the law be-
lieves should be protected. In the second place, we observe, that
if a promisor who has made a contract breaks his promise the
law begins to do the only thing which looks the least like a "com-
mand." It offers the facilities of the courts and legal procedure
to the man wronged to enable him to get something as a substi-
tute for what he ought to have received, and what he would have
received if the other party to the contract had carried out his
promise. Sometimes the law actually decrees "specific perform-
ance" though it is now too late for performance to occur at the
time promised and it is, therefore, really "specific reparation";
but ordinarily it gives the party a judgment for damages in lieu
of that which he should have obtained and helps him by an exe-
2. Freedom of Industry and Contract.
3. Promised Advantages.
4. Advantageous Relations.
5. Free Association.
I. Security of Social Institutions.
A. Domestic.
B. Religious.
C. Political.
III. General Morals.
IV. Conservation of Social Resources.
A. Natural Resources.
B. Dependents and Defectives.
V. General Progress.
A. Economic (Free invention, trade, property, industry).
B. Political (Free criticism and opinion).
C. Cultural (Free science and learning).
VI. Individual Life.
See 3 Dunster House Papers, 3-4; 28 Harv. Law Rev. 343, 445.
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cution to obtain his damages if it is possible to do so in the state
of the promisor's financial condition and in the state of the ma-
chinery of the law.
What we have just found to be true in the case of contract is
true of all the other phenomena of the law. If in pursuance of
our policy we should go through the entire realm of the law,-
domestic relations, property, torts, crimes, equity, negotiable in-
struments, sales, public callings, constitutional law and all the
other branches of the law,-we should find (1) a right, or some
other capacity of influencing the conduct of another recognized
by the law in one person, or set of persons, and (2) some ma-
chinery of the law available for the use of the injured person, or
persons, if he does not get that to which he is entitled from the
other person.
Thus we see that the law accomplishes its purposes by a two-
fold arrangement (1) the recognition in persons of capacities of
influencing the conduct of others, and (2) of permitting them
to resort to the courts for assistance. These are the third and
fourth characteristics of the scheme of social control which is
known as law.
In the third place, then we should note that the law embraces
legal capacities. A legal capacity, or ability, is the capacity, or
ability, given one person, because of some social interest, to con-
trol the conduct of others, through the power of the state. These
legal capacities of influence are rights, powers, privileges and
immunities.9 A legal right is the legal capacity to enforce action
or forbearance by another, as, for example, a contract, or prop-
erty, or personal safety.10 A legal privilege is the legal capacity
to do as one pleases in a certain matter, because he is under no
duty to another, as, for example, a revocable license to walk on
another's land. 1 A legal power is the legal capacity to change
' The best explanation of these terms will be found in an article written by
Hohfeld, 23 Yale L. J. 16 and 26 Yale L. J. 710.
"o Other definitions of the term "right" are the following: "A right is
one's affirmative claim against another." Hohfeld. "A right is the legal re-
lation of two where society enforces action or forbearance for orqe." Corbin.
"A legal right is the capacity residing in one man of controlling with the as-
sent and assistance of the state, the actions of others." Holland.
' Other definitions of "privilege" are: "A privilege is one's freedom from
the right or claim of another." Hohfeld. "A privilege is one's relation to
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or create new legal capacities or liabilities for another or others,
as, for example, ratification or disaffirmance of a contract, or
sale. 2  A legal immunity is the legal capacity to be free from the
legal power or control of another, because it is his privilege, as,
for example, the violation of the obligation of a contract by a
state.13  With the exception of infants, insane persons, and cer-
tain other persons under disability, the law has given to natural
persons full legal capacity, that is, they have all the rights, privi-
leges, powers, and immunities known to the law. Corporations
have only the legal capacity given to them expressly or impliedly
by their charters of incorporation. A sovereign state has legal
capacity against persons, but persons do not have legal capacity
against it except as it gives its consent. Thus, correlative with
the capacity, or ability, to influence the conduct of others, is the
liability to have such conduct influenced. Correlative with
every right there is a duty; with every privilege, a no right; with
every power, a no privilege; and with every immunity, a no
power.
The most important legal capacities are legal rights, and the
most important legal liabilities are legal duties. Social interests
are generally protected by rights, rather than by powers, privi-
leges and immunities. As there are many social interests which
society has decided need protection, so there are many legal
rights, varying with the social interest. Legal rights are classi-
fied 14 as antecedent (or primary) and remedial (or secondary).
Antecedent rights are classified as public and private, and in rem
and in personam. Remedial rights are all in personam. Private
another where he may conduct himself as he pleases in a certain matter."
Corbin. "A privilege is an immunity from liability for what but for the priv-
ilege would be a violation of duty." Pound.
Other definitions of "power" are: "A power is one's affirmative con-
trol over a given legal relation as against another." Hohfeld. "A power is
the legal relation of one to another where one by his voluntary act may cre-
ate new legal relations between them, or between the other and a third."
Corbin. "A power is a capacity conferred or recognized by law of creating,
divesting, or altering rights and so creating or altering duties." Pound.
' Other definitions qf "immunity" are: "An immunity is one's freedom
from the legal power or control of another as regards some legal relation."
Hohfeld. "An immunity is the legal relation where one has no legal power
to affect at least one of the legal relations of another." Corbin.
" HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCL, 160.
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antecedent rights in rem include personal safety, society and con-
trol of family and dependents, property (both real and per-
sonal), freedom of locomotion, reputation, immunity from
fraud, advantages open to the community generally, and privacy;
all of which have been given in their historical order, that is, in
the order in which they have been recognized as legal capacities.
Private antecedent rights in persoam include contracts, quasi
contracts, trusts, bailments, public callings, and other fiduciary
relations. Remedial rights are classified as preventive and re-
dressive, and redressive rights as restorative and compensatory.
Preventive remedial rights include injunction, prohibition and
exemplary damages. Restorative remedial rights include ref-
ormation, rescission, specific performance, mandamus, eject-
ment, replevin, habeas corpus and quo warranto. Compensatory
remedial rights are the rights to damages of some sort, as
nominal, direct, consequential, general, special, etc., which vary
according as the action for damages is ex contractu or ex de-
licto. Enough has been said about rights to give some idea of
their scope. The curricula of our law schools are mostly con-
cerned with them. Most of the law books are about them. If
there was nothing to the law but rights and duties it would be
a very complicated thing and would have to be called a scheme
of social control.
All of the social interests, which society has decided need
protection are protected by means of some of these capacities
of influence, and only in this way; and this is as true in the
realm of criminal law as in the realm of civil law. The
law gives to the state certain public rights, as it gives to
individuals private rights. The first social interest historically
recognized was that in the preservation of the peace. This
was protected civilly by giving to the individual first the right
of personal safety, then by giving him the right to the control
and society of family and dependents, then by the right of prop-
erty, and finally by the rights of freedom of locomotion, repu-
tation, immunity from fraud, advantages open to the community
generally, and privacy. The different social interests are not all
protected in the same way. The social interests in the preserva-
tion of the peace, or in general security, so far as it relates to the
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protection of the physical person against direct injury is pro-
tected by the private antecedent right in rein of personal safety
and by an analogous public right. In the same way the social
interest in the general security of personality so far as it concerns
honor and reputation is protected by the private antecedent right
of reputation, and by an analogous public right. Some social
interests are protected by private rights only, as in the case of
promised advantages. Other social interests are protected by
public rights only, as in the case of general morals and the con-
servation of social resources. Still other social interests are not
protected by rights at all, but by privileges, powers or immuni-
ties. The social interest in the freedom of the will is not only
protected by rights, as in the cases of procuring refusal to con-
tract or breach of contract, fraud and freedom of locomotion,
but by the privilege to avoid a contract procured by duress, or by
undue influence. The economic existence is often protected by
powers and immunities, as well as by rights. This seems a
roundabout way for the law to accomplish its purposes, but
since it is the way of the law it must be considered when anyone
takes up the task of formulating a definition of law.
In the fourth place, something more than the recognition of
legal capacities is, however, as we have seen, necessary for the
protection of social interests. It is not enough to give people legal
capacities and liabilities, rights and duties, etc. Law is a much
more complicated scheme of social control. If there were not
some means for enforcing these rights, powers, privileges and
immunities they might become empty things. The law has rec-
ognized this, and has provided for their enforcement, either by
authorized self-help, as in the case of self-defense, recaption,
entry, and distress damage feasant, or by the courts under estab-
lished rules of legal procedure, known as pleading, evidence, and
practice.
A court "is a tribunal presided over by one or more judges
for the exercise of such judicial power as has been conferred
upon it by law." Courts are of general or limited jurisdiction,
of original or appellate jurisdiction, and of exclusive or concur-
rent jurisdiction. In the United States there is a dual system of
courts, state and Federal. Legal procedure, or adjective law
(because it exists for the sake of substantive law), prescribes
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the modes whereby remedial rights may be secured. In those
exceptional cases where the law still permits self-help it points
out the limits within which it may be exercised. In other cases
it announces the steps which must be taken to set in motion and
to carry through to execution the machinery of the law courts.
Pleadings are the written allegations as to claims and defenses
in an action in court. They are supposed to be a scheme for the
determination of the issues between the litigants. "Evidence in
legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged
matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation,
is established or disproved." It is the information, given by the
respective parties, in the form of statements of witnesses, docu-
ments, or observations made by the tribunal, to the tribunal be-
fore which the cause is tried, upon which to base its decision
upon the issues, or disputed matters of fact. Practice includes
all the steps in legal procedure not included in pleading and evi-
dence, such for example, in a criminal case, as indictment, war-
rant, arrest, preliminary examination, bail, arraignment, plea,
empanelling and swearing the jury, opening statement of state's
attorney, introduction of state's evidence, opening statement of
defendant's attorney, introduction of evidence by defense, re-
quests for instructions, arguments. of counsel, instructions of
court, verdict, new trial, appeal, judgment, and sentence. Legal
procedure itself is no small scheme, and of course it is a part of
the scheme of social control known as the law, and must enter
into any definition of the term law.
W7re have now discovered four concepts, as the chief character-
istics of law. Two of them have to do with the purposes of law.
and two with the means whereby it accomplishes those pur-
poses. A definition of law which includes all of these concepts
and no others would seem to be a correct definition. Law in the
legal sense may, therefore, be defined as follows: Law is a scheme
of social control, backed and sanctioned by the power of the state,
for the protection of social interests, by means of legal capacities
and legal redress.'5
"' The following definition by Wilson is framed on the same theory as the
definition given above, but it does not embrace all the legal concepts which it
ought to embrace: "Law is that part of the established thought and habit,
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The result of law is legal justice, which when perfect may be de-
fined as such an adjustment of the relations of human beings as to
make all discharge all of their duties and other liabilities, and
all obtain all of their rights, privileges, powers and immunities.
What these are depends upon the social interests which society
decrees shall have protection. Legal justice is not as broad as
social justice. Social justice recognizes more social interests
than does legal justice. Consequently it recognizes more rights
and duties. Social justice also recognizes no favored classes,
and it protects groups within nations or as nations as well as in-
dividuals. Legal justice does not go as far as this, but it is tend-
ing in the direction of social justice and it may sometime be
synonymous with social justice. Of course, as a matter of fact,
the law does not make all people discharge their duties, nor see
that all people obtain their rights, privileges, powers, and im-
munities. The law is not perfect. The reason for this is for
the most part the fault of the courts and legal procedure. In
England, because of its reformed court system and reformed
legal procedure, there is a fair approach to an ideal result; but
in the United States the situation is far from it. Criminal pro-
cedure is worse here than civil procedure. But the defects and
failures of legal procedure do not change the nature of law. They
simply show its imperfection and the need of reform. The law
is only a "scheme." The scheme may fail, at least at some times
and in some places, yet the scheme still remains. As a result of
the scheme the legal justice obtained may be very poor, yet it re-
mains true that the law is a scheme for the administration of
justice. For this reason law may be defined, not only as a scheme
of social control, but as the science, that is, the organized body
of knowledge composed of principles, rules and standards, which
deals with the administration of justice. A law, in the specific
sense, may be defined as a principle, rule, or standard in accord-
ance with which justice is administered.'0
which has been accorded general acceptance, and which is backed and sanc-
tioned by the force and authority of the regularly constituted government of
the body politic."
"' This is the more usual way to define law, as witness the following defini-
tions: "The science of law is that organized body of knowledge that has to
do with the administration of justice by public or regular tribunals in ac-
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The definition just stated is in realty the same as-that hereto-
foie given. If the law, through its courts and legal procedure,
administers justice, human beings will discharge all their duties
etc., and obtain all of their rights, etc.; and if human beings dis-
charge all of their duties, etc., and obtain all of their rights, etc.,
all of the social interests as yet recognized will be protected; and
if social interests are protected in this way, the law is a scheme
of social control. Hence, law is a scheme of social control,
backed and sanctioned by the power of the state, for the pro-
tection of social interests, by means of legal capacities and legal
redress.
Hugh Evander Willis.
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cordance with principles or rules of general character and more or less uni-
form application." Pound. "On the whole the safest definition of law in the
lawyer's sense appears to be a rule of conduct binkiing on the members of the
commonwealth as such." Pollock. "The law may be taken for every pur-
pose, save that of strictly philosophical inquiry, to be the sum of rules ad-
ministered by courts of justice." Pollock and Maitland. "Law is a rule of
conduct obtaining among a class of human beings and sanctioned by human
displeasure." Clark. "Law is a general rule of external human action en-
foxced by a sovereign political authority." Holland.
